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Most studies of policy diffusion attempt to infer the processes through which policies spread by 
observing outputs (policy adoptions). We approach these issues from the other direction by 
directly analyzing a key policymaking input – information about others’ policies. Moreover, we 
do so by investigating policy diffusion in cities rather than states. Using a survey of U.S. mayors, 
more specifically, mayors’ own lists of cities they look to for ideas, we find evidence that 
distance, similarity, and capacity all influence the likelihood of a policy maker looking to a 
particular jurisdiction for policy information. We also consider whether these traits are 
complements or substitutes and provide some evidence for the latter. Specifically, we find that at 
times mayors eschew similarity and distance to look to highly respected “high capacity” cities 
but that there is no tradeoff between distance and similarity. 
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One of federalism’s virtues is the potential for lower levels of government to act as policy 
laboratories for each other, and for their higher-level counterparts. For this experimental 
approach to policymaking to work, state and local governments must learn from each other. 
While a wide array of studies investigates cases of policies diffusing, most of this literature looks 
at diffusion by: focusing on states rather than cities; focusing on policy adoption rather than 
policy information; and investigating specific policy issues, usually one per study. Previous 
research offers evidence that a number of mechanisms and/or traits such as geographic proximity 
(Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney 2001), similarity (Grossback, Nicholson- Crotty, and Peterson 
2004; Butler et al. 2015), policy success (Volden 2006; Butler et al. 2015), competition 
(Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 2011), and safety in numbers (Glick 2013), along with policy 
attributes such as salience, observability, and complexity (Boushey 2010; Nicholson-Crotty 
2009; Volden and Makse 2011), affect policy diffusion. 
We contribute to this literature in several ways. First, we explore a relatively novel locus 
of study: cities. While several diffusion articles have used cities as their unit of observation 
(Shipan and Volden 2008; Butler et al. 2015), the bulk of the literature’s emphasis on states 
misses important substantive and methodological advantages that city-level diffusion studies can 
provide. Substantively, in light of growing partisan polarization at the federal and state levels 
(Abramowitz 2010; Shor and McCarty 2011), municipalities are increasingly important venues 
for serious and innovative policymaking. This is especially true for liberals and progressives, 
whose recent electoral defeats at the state and federal levels may make local government the only 
realistic avenue for the advancement of policy goals on a wide range of issues including 
minimum wage (Noguchi 2017), paid parental leave (Hester 2016), and environmental 
regulations (Biggers 2016). Given their increasing policy salience, it is substantively important to 
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systematically test whether diffusion mechanisms identified at the state-level generalize to 
localities. There are reasons to believe that they may not. Cities are constrained by economic 
forces and other factors (e.g. Peterson 1981), as well as by higher levels of government, such that 
the policy areas they address, and the ways they address them, are significantly different from 
states. Moreover, while recent research has highlighted partisanship in local policy 
(Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014; Einstein and Kogan 2016), it has traditionally been expected 
to function differently in cities than in states. Finally, because cities are generally smaller and 
less professionalized than states, policy diffusion might be less systematic, and the sources of 
policy less predictable. Relatedly, it is also possible that the larger number of cities, and the 
diversity of city governments, induces different mechanisms and correlates of diffusion. 
Methodologically, cities offer empirical opportunities that states and nations cannot. 
First, there are many more of them. Indeed, medium and large US cities have roughly six times 
as many potential places to learn from than do U.S. states. This larger universe of cities confers 
value above and beyond increased sample size. It offers greater variation on dimensions key to 
testing important theories of diffusion. For example, states have at most a few neighbors, while 
cities will often have a multitude of other cities nearby. Consequently, in many instances, nearby 
states are fairly similar to each other, making it difficult to parse similarity mechanisms from 
geographic ones. While nearby cities will often share traits, for any given city, it is also likely 
that there are richer and poorer, more and less diverse, and bigger and smaller cities nearby and 
far away. 
Our second central contribution is that, instead of studying the spread of specific policies, 
we look at the pursuit and dissemination of policy information—a step that precedes policy 
adoption. We ask questions about the systematic (or non-systematic) search for, and spread of, 
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policy information. Our work thus links to others’ studies of information in policymaking (e.g. 
Mooney 1991; Mossberger 2000) and to the small number of other works that study policy 
diffusion through early stage inputs rather than outputs (Karch 2012; Butler et al. 2015; Lundin, 
Oberg, and Josefsson 2015). 
To measure cities’ sources of policy information, we use a novel survey of mayors which 
includes respondents from a wide range of cities, including many of the nation’s largest. Among 
other things, we asked mayors to list the three cities they most recently looked to for policy 
ideas. We also asked them why they looked to those particular cities. Focusing on the universe of 
288 U.S. cities with over 100,000 residents, we construct a dataset with all of the actual named 
pairs of cities and all of unnamed, potential pairs. Populating this database with city-level 
geographic, demographic, and other traits, we evaluate key theories in the policy diffusion 
literature. Specifically, we investigate whether mayors use geographic proximity, policy 
success/competence, and/or similarity when evaluating potential sources of policy information. 
In addition, we evaluate whether these different criteria act as complements or substitutes. These 
results provide us with new insight into how political elites evaluate policy challenges, and offer 
evidence on how diffusion networks might manifest as America moves into an era of progressive 
local government policy activism. 
 
1. Theories of Policy Diffusion 
 
Previous scholarship suggests a variety of mechanisms by which lower levels of government 
might learn from one another. Prior research contends that political actors are more likely to 
adopt a policy already implemented by nearby locales (Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney 2001). 
This mechanism may arise because it is easier to observe what those nearby are doing, because 
actors compete with their neighbors for resources (Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 2011), or because 
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neighbors face common challenges. At times, proximity may also be an approximation of 
similarity (discussed subsequently). Applied to our focus on city policy learning leads to H1 
(Proximity): Policymakers are more likely to look to nearby jurisdictions. Proximity in the cities 
context may differ from its application to states. On the one hand, cities may have more other 
cities “close by” to learn from either directly or through regional networks. On the other hand, 
large cities rarely have other large cities as border neighbors in the same way that states do. 
Frequently, between two cities one will find small cities, suburbs, exurbs, and/or rural areas. 
The second main mechanism is similarity (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 
2004; Shipan and Volden 2008). At the most general level, the literature suggests that 
policymakers are more likely to enact policies after similar jurisdictions have done so. The 
general agreement that similarity matters masks important uncertainty. Some focus primarily on 
political and ideological similarity (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004; Butler et 
al. 2015) while others focus more on a broader but less concrete notion of goal similarity (Glick 
and Myers 2014). 
Moreover, disentangling similarity as a mechanism from similar places independently 
adopting similar policies is challenging (Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008). One recent study 
uses a novel experiment to illustrate the salience of ideological similarity and policy success in 
policy diffusion (Butler et al. 2015). Likewise, our focus on policy inputs helps avoid some of 
the challenges that prior scholarship has encountered in attempting to infer similarity using 
observational data and policy adoption as a dependent variable. Finally, similarity also overlaps 
with proximity as neighbors tend to be similar. Again, focusing on intentional searches for 
information and exploiting the variation in cities helps address some of these theoretical and 
empirical challenges. Especially when considering larger cities. Their most similar peers may not 
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be geographically proximate. While neighboring states tend to have a lot in common such that 
many often discuss them as parts of cohesive regions (e.g. New England, the industrial Midwest, 
the West Coast), larger cities are more likely to face choices between learning from the suburban 
or satellite cities around them, and learning from their larger analogues in other parts of the 
country. 
Putting the pieces of this discussion together leads to a general similarity hypothesis H2 
that we split into two pieces: H2A (Political similarity) and H2B (Context similarity). H2A 
asserts that policymakers will look to those with similar political traits because what another 
jurisdiction with similar policy views does will be a good signal for what a similar constituency 
will want. H2B substitutes attributes such as size and economic factors for politics under the 
logic that the policies most likely to fit and work well in a city are those enacted in a similar 
policymaking context. Similarity mechanisms may differ between cities and states. The 
ideological distribution of cities is very different than that of states. Moreover, at least some of 
what cities do may be less ideological such that political similarity matters less, or at least 
differently. Additionally, since cities deal with different issues and constraints, the key 
dimensions of similarity could be different. For example, housing market similarity may matter 
relatively more to cities than states. 
The third and final concept we focus on is capacity and effectiveness. Some cities may 
simply be better places to look to for policy ideas because they are well run, have unusual 
resources, and/or achieve good outcomes. While “capacity” for good policymaking is intuitive, 
the details are a bit murkier. Prior scholarship suggests that higher capacity locales are more 
likely to make good policies and be more professional (Volden 2006), attentive (Shipan and 
Volden 2008), and innovative (Boehmke and Skinner 2012). This idea is also related to learning 
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from successful policies (Volden 2006), but with a focus on the policy’s source rather than the 
policy itself. This brings us to H3 (Policymaking Capacity): mayors will look to jurisdictions 
that they believe to be better, or more innovative, policymakers. While both states and cities 
comprise tremendous variation in resources and professionalism, the potential for capacity 
variation in cities with over 100,000 people is noteworthy. The resources in the New York or Los 
Angeles mayor’s office would obviously dwarf those available in even mid-sized cities. 
These three central ideas—while critically important—are well-trod in diffusion 
scholarship. In contrast, there has been comparatively less consideration of whether political 
elites are required to make tradeoffs when weighing the use of these different criteria. Given 
geographic proximity’s long history in the diffusion literature, we begin with the presumption 
that looking close is the default behavior and that policymakers need a reason to look further 
away. This logic leads us to consider, for example, whether policymakers looking to more distant 
locales as sources of policy information are using another trait—capacity or similarity—as their 
central criteria. This would lead to an inverse relationship between distance and each of the other 
traits. A few cities may be lucky enough to have high capacity (and/or similar) neighbors, but 
since only a fraction of cities can be the highest capacity ones, they may be far away from most 
other cities. Similarly, policymakers may face a tradeoff between learning from high capacity 
places and learning from similar ones (Glick 2014). After testing each mechanism separately, we 
investigate whether mayors are able to find learning targets that offer proximity, similarity, and 
capacity simultaneously, or whether they make tradeoffs among the three. 
 
 
2. Data and Methods 
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In contrast with most work in the literature, we focus on sources of policy ideas rather than the 
spread of one particular policy or a set of specific policies. While studying the adoption of 
policies with event history analysis has yielded many important insights, focusing on the 
adoption of particular policies also comes with inherent limits (Fransese and Hays 2007). By 
centering our analysis on sources of information, we capture patterns unconnected to any one 
particular policy. This is not to say that where mayors look does not vary by issue (in fact, their 
comments suggests for some it does). Because we asked the question in general we are capturing 
their responses across whatever issues they happened to be thinking about, Moreover, by 
illuminating the inputs into policy diffusion, we obtain new leverage for understanding 
mechanisms. The most similar approach to our own comes from Lundin, Oberg, and Josefsson 
(2015) who study diffusion in municipalities in Sweden. Our approach pools across policy areas 
rather than specific policies like Desmarais, Harden, and Boehmke (2015) do for state policies.1 
 Perhaps most importantly, our work is able to provide insight into constrained 
information preferences. That is, each data point (a city) comes at the expense of the opportunity 
cost of other cities not being named. Our subjects neither got to list all of the criteria that might 
matter to them, nor all of the cities they might learn from. Assuming that there are not too many 
cities that are close, similar, and high capacity, listing just three cities imposes constraints. While 
impressive experimental work on local officials has found that both success and similarity 
increase interest in a policy (Butler et al. 2015), our work is able to complement these analyses 
by using constrained (i.e. the set of places to learn from is limited) preferences to better 
understand tradeoffs. Their work shows that, all else equal, success and ideological similarity 
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matter. Our approach sacrifices experimental tidiness for the ability to see how different 
attributes stack up next to each other. 
 
2.1. Survey of Mayors 
 
Building on a growing body of scholarship that uses surveys of local officials to answer 
important policy questions (Gerber, Henry, and Lubell 2013; Butler et al. 2015), we asked a 
nationally representative sample of mayors where they looked to for policy ideas (Einstein and 
Glick 2016). Our target population was the mayors of large and medium-sized cities. We 
attempted to recruit all mayors of cities with 100,000 or more residents. There were 288 such 
cities in the U.S. according to the 2012 American Community Survey. In the weeks before the 
2015 summer meeting of the U.S. Conference of Mayors (USCM), we sent personalized email 
invitations to all mayors in this population that were planning on attending the conference. We 
then followed up on all invitations that did not receive an initial response via email and/or phone. 
There was also an announcement from the podium at one of the conference’s plenary sessions 
reminding the mayors about the survey. All interviews that took place at the USCM meeting 
were conducted in-person directly with the mayor. After the conference, we conducted similar 
outreach to mayors in the target population that did not attend, and conducted phone interviews 
throughout the summer. Importantly, the survey was pitched as a general survey of mayors 
covering issues and leadership, and only about one quarter of respondents participated in person 
at the conference and the rest participating throughout the summer. Thus, mayors did not select 
into participating based on their enthusiasm to talk about policy learning nor does the survey 
reflect these views of an overly “networked” set of conference attendees. 
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 Sixty-three mayors of cities over 100,000 people participated. This equates to a 22% 
response rate from big and medium-city mayors. Due to time and other idiosyncratic reasons, 52 
(an 18% response rate) answered the question of interest about policy diffusion. The vast 
majority of interviews took place either in-person or by phone which guarantees that most (if not 
all) of our responses came directly from mayors rather than staff. As we show in Table A1, the 
participating cities look a lot like the wider universe of American cities.2 While our sample 
skews toward larger cities, the traits of the cities align with the population of interest in 
important ways that might affect policy. The average participating city is very similar to the 
average city over 100,000 residents in terms of population density and racial demographics. It is 
also virtually identical economically as measured by housing prices, income, poverty, and 
unemployment. These residential and demographic traits are the types of variables that affect 
cities’ policy needs, preferences and constraints. Moreover, 66% of the participating mayors are 
Democrats (per our manual web searches and coding). This number matches the estimate for 
larger cities reported in Gerber and Hopkins (2011). Because of its connection to policy priorities 
and city similarity, this representativeness in terms of party affiliation is also important. 
Moreover (and pertinent in a diffusion study) the cities that comprise our data closely match the 
national distribution by the four census regions.3 Our sample skews a slightly toward larger cities 
which is, if anything, preferable; large cities most naturally generalize to states and other large 
political entities. We supplement this 2015 survey with two items from similar survey we 
conducted with mayors in 2014. That survey included items concerning 1) sources of 
information generally and 2) cities that mayors considered to be “well-managed.” We 
incorporate these items into our analysis in a couple of places. This survey included 73 
respondents from across the range of U.S. cities. Similar to the survey that provides most of the 
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variables, it was a general survey of mayors that included an array of questions about policy 
priorities, challenges and city leadership. As with the 2015 survey, responses came directly from 
mayors either in person at a conference or on the phone. We compare the 2014 data to the 
broader population in Table A2. 
 
2.2. Diffusion Measures and Hypothesis Tests 
 
We focus on a small subsection of the broader survey by utilizing responses to the following 
question as our primary variable of interest: “Which three cities (either domestic or foreign) have 
you most recently looked to for policy ideas?” We followed this question by asking mayors why 
they selected their chosen cities. We obtained results like “Portland for biking” or “Louisville 
because we have a lot in common.” While the search for information about a particular policy or 
policy area underlies each observation, the question did not prompt mayors to think about 
anything in particular. We are therefore pooling across a variety of issues and policies rather than 
reporting responses to a question such as “where do you generally get information?” We then 
coded these explanations into categories (see below) for all instances in which we could match a 
city to the reason(s) it was mentioned. This design choice has the benefit of not generalizing 
from a pre-selected policy area. On the other hand, it means our results, and the predictions they 
imply, may miss issue specific variation and other interactions between the general mechanisms 
we focus on and specific policy contexts or attributes. We chose to ask about “the three most 
recent” rather than “most common” sources of information to prompt the mayors to think of 
specific instances. We hoped this would mitigate them answering based on who has a good 
reputation or which cities seem like the best places to look. While this approach risks some 
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recency bias, the fact that the interviews occurred throughout the summer should ameliorate 
these concerns and reduce the chances that the responses are dominated by one temporarily 
salient issue. 
Most of this paper, however, uses more objective measures to infer the reasons for 
information diffusion choices. We use two variables to measure the importance of proximity: 
1) a continuous measure of the distance (in miles) between city pairs, and 2) a binary measure of 
whether two cities are in the same state. We use one variable to measure political similarity: 
city-level Obama vote share in 2008.4 We use eight census traits (from the 2012 ACS) to 
measure trait similarity and related concepts. These eight traits are population (logged), 
population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, percent minority (black+Hispanic+Asian), 
percent with bachelors degrees, median house price, and median house price growth (combining 
2000 and 2012 census data). This set of city traits captures a broad portrait of a city’s people and 
economy. Finally, to approximate policymaking capacity, we use the following question: 
“Which three cities (either domestic or foreign) do you think are the best managed?” from our 
2014 survey of mayors (Einstein, Glick, and Lusk 2015). Thus, we are focused on perceived 
capacity (skill at policy making) rather than actual resources. Among other things, this allows for 
the possibility that some smaller cities with moderate resources are considered among the best 
policy makers. This use of a question from a different year is a virtue. It ensures that mayors’ 
lists of “well-managed cities” and sources of policy ideas are not influenced by one another. A 
mayor in the 2015 survey has no ability to influence the capacity measure (collected in 2014) and 
thus cannot, among other things, use capacity as a justification after naming a city. We use a 
count of well-managed mentions for each city as an indicator of mayors’ perceptions of its 
policymaking capacity/efficacy (we tally these mentions into categories of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 (or 
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more) to prevent outlying cities that were mentioned more than 4 times from driving our 
results.). In the regression analyses, we also include indicators for bigger cities and those with 
higher housing prices, both of which may be associated with capacity and/or success. 
 
2.3. Empirical Approach 
 
Our empirical analyses require us to make comparisons between the places mayors said they 
looked to for ideas to those they did not mention. Finding that the cities mayors targeted were on 
average x miles apart is interesting but ultimately not terribly informative. In contrast, knowing 
that the average “targeted city” was x miles from the “naming city” is much more illuminating 
when we know that the average “non-targeted city” was y miles away. To derive this valuable 
comparison group, we defined our universe as the 288 U.S. cities over 100,000 people, based on 
the 2012 ACS. This provides a reasonable and bounded universe of cities that those in our 
sample could have named. The data suggest that the underlying assumption that cities over 
100,000 people in the U.S. look to other cities over 100,000 is reasonable. Although there are 
thousands of smaller cities in the U.S., and thousands more overseas, only 9% of the cities 
mentioned were not U.S. cities over 100,000 people, and two-thirds of this 9% were large 
foreign cities such as Paris and Bogota. In only five instances did mayors of cities over 100,000 
people name U.S. cities with fewer than 100,000 people. 
 Given this universe, we created a dataset with every possible combination of the 52 
“naming cities” (the participants) and the 288 potential ‘target” cities. There are 14,924 such 
combinations (excluding the possibility of the 52 cities in our sample naming themselves). Of 
these combinations, there are 143 named pairs, coded 1, and 14,781 non-pairs, coded 0. That is 
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99% of the observations are zeros.5 We can then compare the real dyads to the potential (or the 
unnamed) “non-pairings.” 
 Including the entire set of large cities is critical to the analysis. Without the full set of all 
of the non-pairings we would have no baseline for assessing which factors increase the 
likelihood of being named. Additionally, this approach reflects that by choosing to name three 
cities, mayors are implicitly choosing not to name the others. To some extent the large number of 
zeros is driven by our decision to extend the universe down to cities over 100,000 residents. If 
we restricted it to cities over 400K then 95% of the observations would be zeros. If we defined it 
as all cities that were named by someone, we would be left with 94% zeros. While smaller cities 
were named enough to mandate including them in the universe of possibilities, many were not 
named at all. Overall, 16% of cities were named at least once. Only 6% of cities with between 
100 and 200 thousand residents were named by someone. In contrast, over half of the cities with 
over 400,000 residents were named.6 
 Our strategy, however, poses several challenges. One is the sparse matrix of named pairs 
with far more non-pairings than pairings in the data. The large share of non-matches reduces our 
ability to make predictions about the cities that each mayor would name (for the cities in our 
survey sample and those not in the sample). Second, the survey approach of asking each mayor 
to name three, and only three, cities introduces the possibility of false negatives into the data. We 
cannot distinguish between true negatives, cities that a mayor would never name, and false 
negatives, cities that would be named if the mayor were allowed to name more than three cities. 
This limitation therefore biases the results towards zero, and makes the estimates noisier. 
However, we believe our empirical approach, despite its limitations, offers the best framework 
for analyzing how cities identify other cities from which to learn. Among other things, it avoids 
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the selection bias inherent in only looking at actual instances of policy learning or diffusion. 
Moreover, by only asking for three cities, we constrained our respondents such that the cities 
they did name should be meaningful. 
Using these comparison groups, we analyze the key independent variables of interest in 
three ways. First, we calculate raw differences or “distances.” We do this by subtracting the 
value for the naming city from the real or hypothetical target city’s value for each metric. The 
exception is the actual distance in miles measure, which is simply the geographic distance 
between pairs such that large values indicate less proximate cities. 
Second, we evaluate similarity by focusing on non-directional (magnitude only), 
standardized versions of all of our trait variables. We begin with the absolute value of the raw 
“distance” measures to capture the magnitude of the difference between a named and a naming 
city. This approach is similar to that in the network analysis in Gerber, Henry, and Lubell (2013). 
We then standardize these variables around the mean difference by naming city. That is, we take 
the magnitude of each difference, subtract the naming city’s average difference (across the 287 
possible named cities) for each variable, and divide by the standard deviation at the naming city 
level. The end result is a set of variables, one for each demographic trait, in which a value of zero 
indicates an observation in which a city was paired with one that was exactly the average 
distance (of the 287 possible pairings) away from itself, negative values indicate similarity, and 
positive values indicate dissimilarity. 
Creating these scores has two important advantages. First, it accounts for variations in the 
opportunity to name similar cities (and in the magnitude of similarity) based on a naming city’s 
own traits. For example, for cities in the densest part of the distribution, there are many possible 
cities to cite with similar demographic traits; in contrast, cities at the tail of the demographic 
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distribution have few options (or even none). Second, they allow us to compare similarity across 
variables that are on very different scales such as unemployment rate, population, and housing 
prices. 
Following this descriptive analysis, we estimate logit models to simultaneously test the 
hypotheses. Alongside these models (and at length in the appendix) we also we estimate ERGM 
network models (e.g. Cranmer and Desmarais 2010). In both sets of models we include city and 
pair level traits to test for distance, similarity, and capacity effects. After testing the three main 




Our ability to directly ask mayors about policy information diffusion provides important 
descriptive evidence that helps us understand the magnitude of policy diffusion across cities and 
how mayors choose cities from which to learn. Indeed, the diffusion literature’s preponderance 
of studies of one policy at a time cannot tell us how common diffusion actually is. In 2014, when 
we asked mayors how often they used a variety of entities—including other cities/mayors—as 
sources of policy information, “other cities” ranked second only to “your mayoral staff,” and 
ahead of other information sources which we expect to matter in policymaking.7 
Figure 1 illustrates which target cities mayors identified. Each row of the figure lists a 
named target city, and each column corresponds to a city in our survey (names excluded to 
preserve anonymity). For example, the first column of the figure shows that one mayor named 
New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, the three largest cities in the United States. We include all 
cities named more than once. These data show that mayors are citing a wide variety of locations. 
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There is some clustering, with over 10% of mayors mentioning New York, Chicago, 
Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Denver, Austin, Salt Lake City, and Boston. On the other hand, there 
is impressive range. Many cities appear on at least two lists and even the most commonly cited 
cities are only cited by a moderate fraction of respondents. For example, New York, the most 
commonly named city, is only named by 11 of the 53 mayors. There is only one repeated triad of 
cities: Austin, Denver, and Salt Lake City are named by two different mayors. In all other cases 
mayors select a unique set of cities. This figure makes it clear that, while there is some 
clustering, no one city, or subset of cities, is overwhelmingly influential across the mayors in our 
sample. In most cases when two mayors choose the same city, their other two choices are very 
different. For example, among the four cities targeting Pittsburgh, the other selected cities are 
Chicago and Austin, Philadelphia and San Francisco, Chicago and Detroit, and Louisville and 
Cleveland; only Chicago is targeted twice. Consistent with this breadth, 35 other cities, including 
some international ones, were mentioned once. 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Figure 2 turns to unpacking why mayors select these cities using their self-reports. We only 
include the reasons that we could confidently match to the mention of a particular city. By 
far, the most common response was the “policy specific” category, which meant that mayors 
were guided to select a city by a particular policy. For example, if a mayor said, “we looked 
at them for downtown redevelopment ideas” we coded it as a “policy specific” reason. The 
prevalence of this category provides suggestive evidence that specific policy challenges 
often drive policy diffusion. In many instances, the mayors looked to other cities that they 
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perceived as effective in a particular area. One mayor of a medium-sized West Coast city 
succinctly described his efforts to find best practices; when asked why he looked to a 
particular set of cities, he said, “[B]ecause we heard about a best practice...that ‘Oh, they 
found out a way to deal with that. Let’s scratch off Philadelphia and write in [City X] and 
adopt that ordinance.” This search for policy-specific expertise provides some support for 
our hypothesis on capacity and expertise, and likely explains why mayors looked to such a 
wide range of cities, rather than a small subset of dominant cities. 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
 The next two most commonly cited reasons align with two of our hypotheses: 
similarity and capacity/innovativeness. Any mentions of a selected city having a “lot in 
common,” “similar demographics,” or “the same challenges” (for example) fell into the 
similarity category. Reasons such as “they are innovative” or “they do a lot of good things” 
fell into the innovative/well-run category. The next most common reason is also worth 
noting because it is less prominent in the literature. In many instances, mayors focused more 
on the mayor of the city they mentioned than on the city’s particular traits or policies. That 
is, they cited being friends with the mayor, having conversations with the mayor, or 
attending conferences with the mayor. Visits to mayors and their cities were also influential. 
A large West-Coast city mayor noted: “I was just out in Minneapolis and....was a fan....of 
what they’re doing on trails and bike infrastructure. I used those opportunities to expand our 
secondary transit.” While overlapping with the other mechanisms, the relative frequency of 
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this reason (mentioned more than “proximity” for example) points to the fact that personal 
networks and relationships may be under-appreciated as a diffusion mechanism. 
 
3.1. Raw Differences 
 
Figure 3 presents histograms comparing the distributions of the differences or “distances” 
(described above) in the actual dyads (in darker grey) to the full set of cities in the lighter 
shade. We do so for six pertinent variables: distance between cities, city size (logged), 
percent Democrat, percent minority, median housing price, and unemployment rate. For all 
but the straightforward distance measure, positive values indicate that the named city (real 
or “potential”) had a larger value (larger population, more unemployment) than the city that 
named it. Observations close to zero indicate pairings in which the two cities were similar. 
These plots provide a full and transparent accounting of our key data, and allow one to 
easily compare the traits of the cities that mayors said they looked at to all of those they 
could have mentioned but did not. 
We begin with proximity. The upper left corner of Figure 3 provides strong initial 
support for Hypothesis 1. This plot makes clear that policymakers look to cities that are 
more proximate to their own than they would if selecting at random. The modal real pair 
was less than 100 miles apart, and the whole distribution is skewed relative to the full set of 
possibilities. The average distance between actual named pairs was 341 miles closer than the 
mean for all of the other plausible pairs (p < .01). Despite these strong results, it is also 
important to note that in many instances, mayors are not looking to their neighbors (or even 
their extended neighbors). The mean distance between a named and a naming city is still 
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862 miles and the median is 650. 25% of all pairs are more than 1350 miles apart. Thus, 
while there is a general tendency to look close, mayors frequently look far.8 
The other five plots in Figure 3 turn to the similarity and capacity hypotheses. The 
mayors clearly named bigger cities than they would have if choosing at random from the 
available options (p < .000). The real distribution is heavily concentrated to the right of 
zero, with more than 75% of the real dyads including named cities that are larger than the 
naming city. This works against the similarity hypothesis but offers suggestive support for 
the capacity one. One reason for focusing on bigger cities is that they have more resources 
to devote to making and implementing policy. One mayor of a mid-sized Midwestern city 
explicitly cited the idea of aspirational cities his reasons for selecting Minneapolis, Chicago, 
and Austin: “They’re three progressive cities...in each case larger than [my city], but 
[excellent at] addressing issues around attracting and retaining young talent, millennials 
with education. [For] bicycle infrastructure, Minneapolis is just a great city to look for that. 
Arts and culture, Chicago and Austin stand out in my mind.” Consistent with naming bigger 
cities, the mayors also named cities that were more Democratic than their own. In real pairs 
the named city was about 10 points more Democratic than the naming city compared with 
essential parity in the overall distribution (p < .000). This is not to say that ideological 
similarity was irrelevant. Indeed, one mayor of a small southern city cited Mesa, AZ 
because it was “a benchmark for conservatives.” The named pairs also had marginally 
significant differences in relative housing prices. That is, compared to the overall 
distribution, the actual cities mayors mentioned had higher median property values relative 
to their own (p = .07). On the other hand, consistent with the plots, there were no 
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discernable average differences between the named dyads and all dyads on the 
unemployment or percent minority metrics. 
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
3.2. Similarity by Trait 
 
We now focus on the standardized similarity measures we introduced above. Figure 4 plots 
the average dissimilarity scores for the actual named dyads across a variety of variables. A 
score of “1” indicates a pairing in which the named city was 1 standard deviation less 
similar than average and a score of “-1” indicates a city that was 1 standard deviation more 
similar than average. The 0 line does not indicate perfect alignment; it shows average 
dissimilarity. These measures are symmetrical. A city that is 10 points more Democratic 
would receive the same similarity score as one that is 10 points less Democratic. 
Consistent with the skew toward larger cities noted above, the real pairings are 
significantly dissimilar (two standard deviations) in population. Given the findings above, 
most if not all, of this dissimilarity is driven by cities naming others that are larger than their 
own rather than smaller ones.9 The other two variables in which mayors named abnormally 
dissimilar cities were population density and percent bachelors degree. 
In addition to being closer than average in literal distance (top row of the plot), the 
named cities were significantly more similar than average across a handful of demographic 
traits: political difference, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and percent minority. The only 
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two variables in which named cities were not significantly more or less similar than if 
chosen at random were housing prices and housing price growth. 
 
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
3.3. Regression Models 
 
To more rigorously test hypotheses H1 (Proximity), H2A (Political similarity), H2B 
(Context similarity), and H3 (Policymaking capacity), we use simple logit models to 
estimate the likelihood of a named pair. The dependent variable in these models is a binary 
indicator of actual named pairs. The models include two proximity measures: Same State 
and Standardized Distance (outlined above). 
We also incorporate five variables to assess our similarity hypotheses. For all of the 
following standardized similarity variables, higher values indicate greater dissimilarity. 
Standardized Population Similarity measures the difference in population between the 
surveyed city and potential matches. Standardized Similarity Index captures overall city trait 
similarity. It is the mean of all of the standardized similarity measures10 except for the 
political and population ones (which are included separately).11 Standardized Political 
Similarity measures political similarity. Finally, we include two dummy variables, Bigger 
City, which is coded as 1 if the named city has a larger population than the surveyed city, 
and Higher Housing Prices, which is coded as 1 if the named city has higher average 
housing prices than the surveyed city. Unlike the population and political similarity 
measures and the similarity index—which treat equally small and large deviations as the 
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same—these dummy variables allow us to examine if bigger or wealthier cities are more 
likely to be named. Finally, to test the policymaking capacity hypothesis, we rely on the 
Well-Managed City variable. We also include regional fixed effects (based on census 
region) to account for regional differences across surveyed cities. Since each naming city 
selects three different cities (and implicitly declines to choose the 284 other cities as one of 
their top three), observations are not independent at the naming city level. As a result, we 
cluster the standard errors by naming city. 
In addition to the logit models, we also model the relationship as a network using 
exponential random graph models (ERGMs) to estimate the likelihood of a named pair. We 
construct a directional network where each node is one of the 288 possible target cities. For 
each of the 52 naming cities in the sample, we add a directed edge to each of the target cities 
that the mayors identified. These models have become increasingly popular in political 
science and policy studies (e.g. Cranmer and Desmarais 2010; Lubell et al. 2012; Leifeld 
and Schneider 2012; Box-Steffensmeier and Christenson 2014, 2015). They have been used 
to make inferences about observations rather than whole networks (e.g. Desmarais and 
Cranmer 2012), to model policy diffusion (e.g. Desmarais, Harden, and Boehmke 2015) and 
to infer the effects of similarity (e.g. Gerber, Henry, and Lubell 2013). These models, 
among other things, allow us to explicitly incorporate the constraint that each naming city 
could only give identify three target cities. They should also ameliorate some potential 
concerns about the sparse matrix of pairs because they can account for the zeros (non-
existent edges), and they allow us to include a mutual dependence term. 
Table 1 presents the results.12 Models 1, 2, and 3 estimate the probability of a city 
being targeted using the corresponding variables for hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, 
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respectively, Model 4 pools all three sets of variables, and Model 5 incorporates Model 4’s 
covariates using an ERGM. The results in models 4 and 5 are nearly identical, indicating 
that the constraint of three target cities for each respondent, which is included in model 5 but 
not in model 4, is not biasing our primary results. We provide more information (including 
diagnostics) about, and results from, the ERGM in the appendix. 
While the coefficient sizes vary, the direction and statistical significance of the 
variables are consistent across the models. We find significant evidence supporting the 
proximity hypothesis. The positive coefficient on Same State is substantively large and 
statistically significant; cities are more likely to target another city in their state than cities in 
other states. The coefficient on Standard Distance is likewise significant but negative. As 
the distance between cities increases, they are less likely to be targeted. 
On our two similarity hypotheses, we find mixed results. The coefficient on political 
similarity is negative, as expected, but not significant. On trait similarity, we find a 
significant negative relationship on the similarity index, indicating that more similar cities 
are more likely to be targeted. However, our models also reveal significant positive 
relationships on dummy variables for Bigger City and Population Similarity. Cities are more 
likely to target larger cities, not similarly sized cities. We also find a positive and weakly 
significant coefficient on Higher Housing Prices. Thus, the empirical evidence on similarity 
is inconsistent. Cities are more likely to look to larger and more expensive cities, but also 
prefer cities with similar characteristics on other dimensions. One possibility is that city size 
and housing prices are picking up on capacity/success rather than similarity, suggesting 
some support forH3. 
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Finally, and more explicitly focused on H3, we find strong evidence in favor of the 
policymaking capacity hypothesis. The coefficient on the Well-Managed City variable, our 
proxy for policymaking capacity, is large, positive, and statistically significant. Mayors are 
choosing to target cities that are seen by other mayors as well-managed. Interestingly, the 
effect of capacity does not appear to vary in either direction with the capacity of the naming 
city. Overall, cities that were named at least twice as high capacity cities by other mayors 
named another high capacity city about 65% of the time compared to 50% of the time for 
low capacity naming cities. Much of this difference appears to be driven by the fact that the 
high capacity cities tend to be larger and name other larger cities. If we focus only on cities 
over 300,000 residents, cities that are and are not frequently named as “well-managed” 
name well-managed cities at almost identical rates. This analysis is very tentative and the 
cells are very small, but it at least suggests that a city’s own capacity does not affect where it 
searches for information. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
3.4. Tradeoffs Between Mechanisms 
 
Thus far we have shown that distance, similarity, and success/capacity are all 
associated with the places mayors look to for policy ideas, but that each of the three can 
only contribute to explanations of some of the data points. The most likely explanation for 
these mixed findings is that (1) there is not one dominant mechanism and (2) the three are 
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often incompatible. This means that there are potentially important tradeoffs between the 
different diffusion mechanisms. 
To begin assessing the possibility of tradeoffs, we investigate bivariate relationships 
(distance vs capacity, distance vs. similarity, and similarity vs. capacity) using our 
standardized geographical distance, similarity index, and well managed mentions variables. 
Our interest is the strength and direction of the relationship between each pair of variables 
for the actual named pairs in the data. In short, seeing an inverse relationship between two 
variables in the actual city pairs that is not manifest in the underlying distribution of all 
possible pairs suggest mayors are making an implicit or explicit tradeoff. 
In Figure 5 we plot the data for all named pairs for each of three tradeoffs. We also 
plot Lowess lines for a) the named pairs (red solid line) and b) all possible pairs (dashed 
green line). As the plots show, the strongest ostensible tradeoff is between distance and 
capacity. There is no relationship in the full set of possible pairs. However, when mayors 
name higher capacity cities, they tend to name those that are further away, and they very 
rarely name lower capacity cities that are also distant. In contrast, there is no evidence 
whatsoever of a tradeoff between distance and similarity. The plot through the actual pairs 
and the plot through all possible pairs are parallel. More importantly, they show a positive 
rather than an inverse relationship. Sometimes mayors look at far away and dissimilar cities, 
and at others they look at proximate and similar targets. Rarely do they look to distant and 
similar, or near and dissimilar, cities. Finally, the plot of the relationship between capacity 
and proximity provides tentative evidence of a more modest tradeoff. When mayors look to 
high capacity cities, they tend to look to those which are less similar. This makes sense 
because many of the cities cited for their policy making capacity are very large and may 
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have less in common with smaller cities that look to them. Finally, while not in the text, we 
note that we find little evidence of a tradeoff between political similarity and distance or 
capacity. 
 
[FIGURE 5 HERE] 
 
Because of the modest number of observations and the quantitative and qualitative 
insight we have into the variety of considerations between each mayor’s choices, we 
interpret these bivariate relationships cautiously. To bolster the visual analysis, we estimated 
models to test for similar effects in the appendix. These models, which include controls for 
political similarity, whether the named city was bigger, and whether the named city had 
higher housing prices, comport with the bivariate plots here. Indeed, if anything they 
provide stronger evidence for a tradeoff between capacity and similarity than does the 
descriptive plot. Nevertheless, we emphasize the more cautious interpretations and plots 
presented above. 
In sum, the data at least suggest that mayors face, and make, tradeoffs between 
capacity and each of the other two variables. When mayors look to close and/or similar 
cities, they are looking at places other mayors are less likely to name as high capacity cities. 
In contrast, we find evidence contrary to a tradeoff between similarity and distance. Both in 
the universe of cities and in the set of actual pairs, they move in tandem. Closer cities tend 
to be more similar and mayors often look to cities that meet both criteria. When they look 
further away, presumably for capacity reasons, they tend to give up both proximity and 
similarity. As with the main results above, these findings are consistent with multiple 
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diffusion mechanisms and calculations. At times mayors prioritize “fit” (e.g. similarity and 




The data we introduce and analyze offer unprecedented direct insight into how local 
political elites acquire policy information, and how this contributes to the diffusion of 
policies. Indeed, we find evidence that mayors obtain policy information from similar, 
proximal, and high-capacity cities. In short, we find that previously identified diffusion 
mechanisms and systematic policy learning generalize to a) the information gathering stage, 
b) U.S. cities, and c) new data and empirical approaches. Cities and mayors are taking on 
complicated and, at times, ideological policy issues. When they do so, they are gleaning 
ideas and identifying workable innovations in a similar manner to states. When asked for 
three cities they recently looked to for ideas, mayors neither produced a random list nor did 
they all say “New York” or the closest big city to their own. Their responses indicate 
systematic and intentioned learning which matters both as a new empirical test in the 
literature, and because what cities do is so consequential for their residents, businesses, and 
visitors. 
On the other hand, mayors’ responses also included hints of intriguing differences 
between policy learning in cities and states. While currently untestable because comparable 
data do not exist for governors, these hints speak to future research questions and to the 
potential for important variations in the mechanisms and manifestations of diffusion. For 
instance, of all of the traits we looked at in the similarity index, the ones on which naming 
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and target cities were most similar were those related to the housing market (e.g. median 
price). This is especially noteworthy because we also know that some of the most commonly 
cited cities, often for capacity reasons, were extreme outliers in terms of housing prices 
suggesting that the other pairs stuck very close to their peers on this dimension. This 
housing similarity makes perfect sense for cities because of the links between housing prices 
and urban tax base, and because housing and development is so central to urban policy and 
constraints on it. This at least tentatively suggests the need to delve into “similarity” in more 
depth. Are policy makers targeting their sources of information in nuanced enough ways 
that different similarity parameters drive diffusion at different levels of government? Are 
other factors such as size, or density, or ideology relatively more important when states 
learn from each other? We also find indirect quantitative, and very direct qualitative, 
evidence that mayors are not relying on all of the key attributes at once. This finding is 
important. It suggests that mayors are looking to different kinds of cities depending upon the 
type of concern. Perhaps certain kinds of policy issues drive mayors to seek information 
from different types of cites. Policy-specific concerns appear to motivate mayors to look 
farther afield, while an emphasis on similarity unsurprisingly spurs mayors to search for 
ideas from similar communities. Future research focused on multiple policy arenas, rather 
than the single-issue analyses typical in the diffusion literature, might begin to outline what 
kinds of policy initiatives lend themselves to high-capacity versus similar versus proximal 
cities. 
More generally, and methodologically, our results militate in favor of studies that 
focus directly on political elites. By analyzing elites and information—rather than a single 
policy— our findings allow us to speak somewhat generally about the underlying factors 
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driving policy diffusion. In addition to the statistical evidence from closed-ended survey 
responses, we also were able to obtain rich open-ended responses from mayors that further 
illuminate the elite processes undergirding policy diffusion. These responses augment the 
statistical findings by adding depth to the mayors’ considerations of factors such as 
similarity. They also, however, demonstrate that these variables and other theories in the 
literature can only partly explain diffusion. Indeed, some of the responses point to more 
idiosyncratic and personalized patterns of information sharing. 
This qualitative evidence points to another intriguing potential difference between 
city and state diffusion, and more generally, to a harder to observe but important diffusion 
channel. Specifically, some of the qualitative evidence speaks to the importance of variables 
and mechanisms beyond the three we provide systematic evidence of. For example, at least 
some of the mayors spoke more in terms of another mayors’ qualities and expertise rather 
than his or her city’s. In many cases, mayors’ views of, or individual connections to, each 
other appear to matter more than systematic city-level traits. That is, assessments of 
individual mayors, and the network of mayors, may be driving capacity diffusion 
mechanisms. The same city could be considered “high capacity” under one mayor’s 
leadership but not her successor’s. Relatedly, the open-ended explanations also speak to the 
depth of variables like success and capacity. They captured mayors citing conference 
presentations, grant competitions, and lobbying networks that informed them about the 
ostensibly innovative and effective cities, and initiatives from which they wanted to learn. In 
light of cities’ growing policy salience, we hope that future scholarship will incorporate 
these more novel, and less quantifiable, diffusion mechanisms that require a mix of methods 
and continued focus beyond policy choices. Perhaps states, which tend to have more 
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professionalized and permanent executive and legislative resources behave differently. 
Perhaps they behave similarly and other states are learning as much from Governor Brown 
as they are from California. This discussion is very speculative, but speaks both to the 
importance of future work, and to the value of qualitative methods in the study of diffusion. 
Finally, we believe that mayors’ emphasis on success and capacity in particular—and 
their willingness to trade off proximity and similarity to look to high capacity cities (or 
mayors)—may be important beyond simply understanding the sources of mayoral policy 
ideas. Our qualitative interviews with mayors—and the policy-specific reasons they 
provided when asked why they looked to a particular city—suggest that, when mayors look 
far afield for policy ideas, they are doing so thoughtfully. We could imagine, then, that these 
carefully selected policy ideas are more likely to be successful than initiatives chosen 
haphazardly and quickly. 
We hope that future scholars take this results as a starting point to investigate the 
impact of these policymaking decisions. Do cities that look farther for policy ideas actually 
implement better policy? Are these thoughtfully governed cities high achieving across a 
variety of dimensions because of the care with which their leaders select policies? They 
might grow more rapidly and/or attract businesses and high quality employees, for example. 
Cities face many challenges. Those that address their challenges most effectively likely have 
mayors that actively seek out policy innovations and learn from a wide variety of other 
cities, both near and far. New approaches and carefully refined best practices should not be 
confined to the places that develop them; by learning from each other, cities can avoid 
pitfalls and achieve greater success than they could on their own.
33  
                                                     
1 In the US context, our approach is in some respects similar to Glick and Friedland (2014), 
which tabulated and analyzed the other states mentioned in policy research briefs prepared in 
two states. Our design comprises a range of city and insight into information sources direct 
from senior policymakers (mayors). 
2 Demographic comparisons use 2012 demographic data from the American Community Survey. 
3 In our sample, the proportion of cities (that answered the diffusion question) located in 
the Midwest, Northeast, South, and West are 18%, 9%, 36%, and 36% respectively vs. 17%, 
9%, 35%, and 40% nationally. 
4 We were unable to find or calculate city-level Obama vote share for 5 of the 52 naming cities 
and 19 of the 288 potential target cities. For these cities, we used 2008 county-level vote share 
in place of city-level vote share. Excluding the cities where city-level vote share is missing does 
not substantively affect the results. 
5 In addition to the 9% that named smaller or foreign cities, a few mayors did not name a full 
set of three cities such that we have 143 instead of 156 named pairs. 
6 One possible concern with this approach is that our choice of including all cities with 
populations greater than 100,000 people may bias our results. That is, if we were to set the 
cutoff lower and include more cities, or set the cutoff higher and exclude potential targets, the 
results might change. To address this concern, we estimate logit models using cutoffs ranging 
from cities of 50,000 people (773 cities) to 250,000 people (73 cities). These results are 
reported in Figure C3. Varying the population cutoff does not substantively affect the results. 
7 See Figure A1 in the Appendix for the full results. 
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8 Related to distance, we can also look at the propensity to name cities that are in the same 
state. Approximately 20% of actual pairs were in the same state compared to only 6% of the 
non-pairs (p < .01). What is less clear at this point is whether doing so is evidence for a 
proximity mechanism or a similarity one. Cities in the same state will naturally have important 
traits in common, most notably, the same state laws and state government. Indeed, one mid-
sized southern mayor’s explanation for his cited cities seems to point to the latter. He named 
one of his three cities, which was located in the same state as his city, because “we have the 
same state legislature to deal with.” 
9 Importantly, this finding is not solely driven by mayors naming New York, the most commonly 
named city. Even dropping all observations involving New York, named cities were more than .7 
standard deviations less similar than average (p < .000). They were still significantly more 
different when dropping mentions of Los Angeles. 
10 These measures are: poverty, unemployment, minority %, bachelors degree %, housing 
prices, housing price growth, and density. 
11 These variables seem to pick up on intuitive (but non-obvious) similar and dissimilar 
cities. For example, Milwaukee’s five most similar cities using our index are Springfield MA, 
Allentown PA, St. Louis MO, Rochester NY, Buffalo NY. Madison, the nearest city over 100K 
people is actually quite dissimilar to Milwaukee on our index. 
12 To check for robustness, we also estimate the model using rare-events logit and ordinary 
least squares (Table C1). Given the similarity of the logit and rare-events logit models, and the 
consistency of the results across models, we use standard logit for the results presented in the 
paper, and display the alternative model results in the appendix. 
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Table 1: Base Models 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) -5 
 
logit logit logit logit ERGM 
           
Same State 0.8363** 
  





































































1.1330** 0.9777**  0.866***   
   












(0.0712) (0.3565) (0.0877) (0.3254) 
 
      Observations 14,924 14,924 14,924 14,924   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.0. Standard errors 
clustered by naming city. 







Figure 1: City Mentions. Each row lists a city named more than once, and each column 
corresponds to a city in our sample. Excludes the 20 cities over 100,000 people that are only 
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Figure 4: Standardized dissimilarity scores for named dyads. The zero line indicates 
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Figure 5: Two way tradeoffs (raw data) between distance, similarity, and capacity for 
named pairs 
 
